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Abstract
Inspired by the Chinese experience, we develop a Schumpeterian growth model of
distance to frontier in which economic growth in the developing country is driven by
domestic innovation as well as imitation and transfer of foreign technologies through
foreign direct investment. We show that optimal intellectual property rights (IPR)
protection is stage-dependent. At an early stage of development, the country imple-
ments weak IPR protection to facilitate imitation. At a later stage of development, the
country implements strong IPR protection to encourage domestic innovation. There-
fore, the growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing levels of patent strength increase
as the country evolves towards the world technology frontier, and this dynamic pattern
is consistent with the actual evolution of patent strength in China.
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"China and others are entering the tricky middle-income stage of development in
which the big advances from absorbing rich-world technology start to run out."
The Economist (2011)
1 Introduction
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the implementation of a modern intellectual property
rights (IPR) system in China was subject to intense debates.1 Proponents including Deng
Xiaopeng, the paramount leader of China at that time, saw the creation of a modern IPR
system in China as a necessary means to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and to
provide incentives for domestic innovation. In 1982, the rst intellectual property law under
the leadership of Deng was drafted in China. Then, through a series of policy reforms, the
strength of patent rights in China increased over time. For example, the Ginarte-Park index
of patent rights in China gradually increased from 1.33 in 1985 to 4.08 in 2005.2 In 1992,
the statutory term of patent in China was lengthened from 15 years to 20 years.3 Then, in
compliance with the TRIPS agreement,4 China reformed its patent system again in 2000.5
Recently, the Third Amendment to the Chinese Patent Law was approved in December 2008
and came into e¤ect in October 2009 with the objective of building China into an innovative
country with well-protected IPR by 2020.6 Following these patent reforms, research and
development (R&D) as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) in China increased
from 0.7% in 1992 to 1.7% in 2009. As for the inow of FDI to China, it increased from
US$11 billion in 1992 to US$185 billion in 2010.7
1See for example Allison and Lin (1999) and La Croix and Konan (2002) for a discussion on the historical
development of IPR in China.
2The Ginarte-Park index is on a scale of 0 to 5, and a larger number implies stronger patent rights. See
Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008a) for a detailed description of this patent index.
3As for the term of patent for utility model and design patents, it was lengthened from 5 years to 10
years. Also, this patent reform expanded patentable subject matter in China.
4The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is an agreement of
the World Trade Organization (WTO). In summary, TRIPS establishes a minimum level of IPR protection
that must be provided by all member countries.
5The policy changes include (a) providing patentholders with the right to obtain a preliminary injunction
against the infringing party before ling a lawsuit, (b) stipulating standards to compute statutory damages,
(c) a¢ rming that state and non-state enterprises enjoy equal patent rights, and (d) simplifying the patent
application process, examination and transfer procedures and unifying the appeal system. See for example
Hu and Je¤erson (2009) who show that this patent reform is a major factor for explaining the increase in
patenting activities in China.
6See for example Yang and Yen (2010) for a review of the policy changes in this third amendment. In
summary, the changes aim at (a) promoting patent applications, (b) encouraging exploitation of jointly owned
patents, (c) heightening patentability requirement, (d) increasing statutory damages and administrative nes,
(e) clarifying the granting of compulsory licenses, and (f) establishing protection for genetic resources.
7Data from the World Development Indicators.
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In addition to strengthening patent rights, China also improved the protection for trade
secrets by developing a comprehensive set of laws and regulations over the last two decades.8
In a recent report issued by NERA Economic Consulting, Sepetys and Cox (2009, p. 3)
nicely summarize the evolution of IPR in China as follows.
In the early stages of development, with limited resources and limited ca-
pacity for research and development, there may be little or no IPR protection.
Domestic industry will be characterized by imitation rather than innovation. Im-
itation allows for low-cost production, low prices for goods and services, and the
stimulation of consumption and employment. A weak IPR regime may support
technological growth and development through imitation in early stages of de-
velopment. At subsequent stages of development, however, a weak IPR regime
discourages domestic innovation. Innovation and technological development are
drivers of economic growth. Economies that succeed in shifting into knowledge-
based production are characterized by domestic innovation, typically supported
with well-designed and adequately enforced IPR laws.
In this study, we develop a stylized growth-theoretic model to formalize this commonly
discussed insight on the evolution of IPR in developing countries using China as a timely
example. For example, one objective of Chinas twelfth ve-year plan (2011-2015) is to shift
its reliance on foreign technology to domestic innovation. A recent study by Li (2010) pro-
vides an interesting case-study analysis on the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries
to demonstrate that China is in the process of transforming from an imitation-oriented econ-
omy to an innovation-oriented economy and that strengthening patent rights can play an
important role in facilitating this transformation process. This nding is consistent with the
implication of our analysis.
To analyze stage-dependent IPR for a developing country at di¤erent stages of develop-
ment, we consider a Schumpeterian growth model of distance to frontier in which economic
growth in the developing country is driven by domestic innovation as well as imitation and
transfer of foreign technologies through FDI. We show that the model features an inverted-
U e¤ect of patent strength on domestic innovation under a certain parameter space. The
intuition is as follows. On the one hand, increasing patent strength has a positive e¤ect on
domestic innovation by reducing imitation. On the other hand, the reduction in imitation
leads to an increase in FDI that strengthens the displacement e¤ect of foreign technologies
on domestic innovation. As for the growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing strengths of
IPR protection, we show that they are stage-dependent. At an early stage of development,
8See for example Zuber (2008) for a discussion on the protection of trade secrets in China and the US.
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the country implements weak IPR protection to facilitate imitation of foreign technolo-
gies. At a later stage of development, the country implements strong IPR protection to
encourage domestic innovation. Specically, we derive an analytical result to show that the
growth-maximizing level of patent protection increases as the country evolves towards the
world technology frontier. Furthermore, we provide a numerical result to illustrate that the
welfare-maximizing level of patent protection also increases as the country evolves towards
the world technology frontier. These ndings are consistent with the actual evolution of
patent strength in China and other developing countries.
This study relates to the literature on IPR and economic growth. This literature focuses
on an important issue that is optimal IPR protection. An early study by Nordhaus (1969)
nds that the optimal patent length should balance the static distortionary e¤ect of markup
pricing and the dynamic gain from enhanced innovation. In a dynamic general-equilibrium
model, Judd (1985) nds that the optimal patent length is innite while Iwaisako and Fu-
tagami (2003) and Futagami and Iwaisako (2007) nd that the optimal patent length can
be nite in a version of the Romer model. Kwan and Lai (2003) show that extending the
e¤ective lifetime of patent would lead to a substantial increase in R&D and welfare whereas
Li (2001) and ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) consider the e¤ects of patent breadth on
R&D and economic growth. Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007) and Davis and Sener (2012)
analyze the e¤ects of rent protection activities on innovation. Chu (2009) and Chu et al.
(2012) analyze the e¤ects of blocking patents on R&D and welfare. Recently, Acemoglu and
Akcigit (2012) consider optimal state-dependent patent protection based on the endogenous
technological gap between the leader and followers in an industry. However, this literature
rarely considers optimal IPR protection in developing countries in which economic growth is
driven by imitation and transfer of foreign technologies in addition to domestic innovation.
We ll this gap in the literature by analyzing the optimal strength of IPR protection in a
developing country at di¤erent stages of economic development.9
Our study also relates to the literature on IPR and North-South product cycles.10 A key
question in this literature is whether strengthening Southern IPR protection stimulates or
sties Northern innovation. Grossman and Helpman (1991) nd that strengthening Southern
IPR protection either has no e¤ect or a negative e¤ect on Northern innovation.11 Lai (1998)
9Chen and Puttitanum (2005) also argue that optimal IPR protection should depend on a countrys
level of development, and they analyze this issue in a one-period game-theoretic model in which the level of
development is captured by an exogenous parameter.
10See for example Grossman and Helpman (1991), Helpman (1993), Lai (1998), Yang and Maskus (2001),
Glass and Saggi (2002a, 2002b), Glass and Wu (2007), Tanaka et al. (2007), Parello (2008), Dinopoulos and
Segerstrom (2010), Branstetter and Saggi (2011) and Iwaisako et al. (2011).
11Grossman and Helpman (1991) consider a tax (subsidy) on imitation that decreases (increases) Southern
imitation, which is similar to the e¤ects of IPR protection.
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shows that whether Southern IPR protection has a positive or negative e¤ect on Northern
innovation depends on the mode of technology transfer (i.e., imitation versus FDI) whereas
Glass and Wu (2007) argue that the e¤ect also depends on the type of technological inno-
vation (i.e., quality improvement versus variety expansion). Instead of analyzing the e¤ects
of Southern IPR protection on Northern innovation, the present study focuses on a di¤erent
issue that is optimal IPR protection in the South as a function of its technology distance
from the North.
An inuential study by Grossman and Lai (2004) considers globally optimal IPR protec-
tion in an open-economy model featuring both developed and developing countries that have
asymmetric innovative capability and market size. The present study di¤ers from Gross-
man and Lai (2004) by considering a model in which (a) economic growth in the developing
country is driven by both domestic innovation and foreign technology transfer and (b) the
relative importance of innovation and technology transfer changes endogenously as the coun-
try evolves towards the world technology frontier. These two features together imply that
optimal IPR protection should be stage-dependent, which is an important property that is
absent in all the abovementioned studies.
Finally, this paper relates mostly to studies on distance to frontier and convergence; see
Acemoglu et al. (2003, 2006), Aghion et al. (2005), Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), Ben-
habib et al. (2012) and Gersbach et al. (2013). Our paper extends these inuential studies
by endogenizing an important economic institution that is the IPR system and analyzing
how it evolves as an economy develops towards the world technology frontier.12 Further-
more, we consider innovation and multiple channels of foreign technology transfer through
imitation and FDI that are key features of the Chinese economy.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts.
Section 3 describes the theoretical model. Section 4 analyzes stage-dependent IPR protec-
tion. Section 5 explores various extensions of the model. The nal section concludes with a
discussion.
2 Stylized facts
In this section, we rst present the cross-sectional relationship between patent strength and
the distance to frontier. We obtain data on labor productivity relative to the US (i.e., US
12Wu (2010) also considers the e¤ects of IPR protection in a Schumpeterian model of distance to fron-
tier; however, he focuses on the existence of non-convergence traps and how patent protection a¤ects the
convergence of developing countries. Our study di¤ers from his interesting analysis by introducing FDI to
the distance-to-frontier model and by analyzing the growth-maxizing and welfare-maximizing paths of IPR
protection in developing countries.
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labor productivity is normalized to one) from the Penn World Table, and this variable,
relative labor productivity (RLP), inversely measures the distance to frontier. To capture
the strength of IPR, we consider the standard Ginarte-Park index of patent rights, which is
available with one observation every 5 years for each country. Figure 1 presents a very clear
positive relationship between IPR and RLP for data in 2005.13 This empirical correlation is
consistent with a key result from our theoretical model, according to which a country that
is closer to the frontier has the incentive to implement stronger patent rights.
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Figure 1: Relationship between IPR and distance to frontier
From our theoretical analysis, we will show that the result of this stage-dependent IPR
policy is driven by the following important property of the model: the positive growth e¤ect
of IPR through innovation strengthens relative to the negative growth e¤ect of IPR through
imitation as a country evolves towards the technology frontier. Therefore, in the rest of this
section, we consider a panel regression model to establish some suggestive evidence for these
e¤ects. In the empirical literature, it is well known that the growth e¤ects of IPR protection
di¤er across developed and developing countries; see for example Park (2008b) for a survey.
In the following empirical framework, instead of treating developed and developing countries
as separate groups, we use a distance-to-frontier variable to capture the degree of economic
development as a continuous variable and nd that it indeed has an interactive e¤ect with
IPR on economic growth. Specically, we consider an unbalanced panel from 1970 to 2005
for 92 countries.14
13This positive relationship would also emerge if we look at data in other years.
14We include all countries with available data for each variable in at least some years during this period.
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We consider the following empirical specication.
growthi;t+1 = 0 + 1IPRi;t + 2IPRi;t RLPi;t + 3RLPi;t +  i;t + "i;t,
where growthi;t+1 is the growth rate of per capita GDP in country i, that is lnGDPi;t+1  
lnGDPi;t. IPRi;t is the Ginarte-Park index of patent rights.15 RLPi;t is relative labor
productivity dened above. Vector i;t denotes standard control variables including (a)
education measured by the average years of schooling from the Barro-Lee data set, (b) the
degree of openness measured by the sum of export and import over GDP from the Penn
World Table, (c) an index of economic freedom from the annual report of Economic Freedom
of the World, (d) country xed e¤ects, and (e) period xed e¤ects. Di¤erentiating growth
with respect to IPR, we have
@growthi;t+1
@IPRi;t
= 1 + 2RLPi;t.
Our hypothesis is that 1 < 0 and 2 > 0. In other words, for a country that is far away from
the world technology frontier (i.e., a small RLPi;t), the e¤ect of IPR on economic growth is
negative. For a country that is close to the world technology frontier (i.e., a large RLPi;t),
the e¤ect of IPR on economic growth becomes positive. In summary, our empirical results
below indeed show that 1 < 0 and 2 > 0.
[Insert Table 1 here]
We have considered a number of estimation techniques. The results are summarized in
Table 1, in which the dependent variable is growthi;t+1. The rst column of Table 1 reports
the coe¢ cients of the country xed e¤ects estimation, whereas the second column also in-
cludes period e¤ects, which may reect technical progress and business cycle components
common to all countries, in addition to the persistent country-specic aspects such as geog-
raphy, institutions, and initial e¢ ciencies. Both country and period xed e¤ects are jointly
signicant with p-value lower than 1%. Similarly, country dummies are signicant given
period dummies, and period dummies are signicant given country dummies. We have also
performed Hausman tests based on the di¤erence between xed e¤ects and random e¤ects,
which reject the random e¤ects specication at less than 1% signicance. To partially correct
for the endogeneity of the explanatory variables, we have also reported in the third column
the 2-stage least square coe¢ cients for which the instruments are the lagged independent
15It is true that the Ginarte-Park index of patent rights may not be a perfect measure of relative patent
strength across countries; however, so long as this mismeasurement is time invariant, it will be captured by
country xed e¤ects.
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variables. Neither the signs nor the magnitude of the coe¢ cients change much.16 Therefore,
the available cross-country evidence seems to provide suggestive evidence that the benecial
growth e¤ect of IPR strengthens relative to the negative e¤ect as a country evolves towards
the world technological frontier. Our theoretical model in the next section serves to provide
a causal interpretation on these empirical correlations.
3 A simple model of distance to frontier
We consider a Schumpeterian growth model of distance to frontier.17 The discrete-time
model has four components (a) individuals, (b) nal goods, (c) intermediate goods, and (d)
R&D. We solve for the decentralized equilibrium. In each period, there is a unit continuum
of risk-neutral individuals indexed by j. Each individual j lives for one period, inelastically
supplies one unit of labor and consumes nal goods to maximize expected utility. To facilitate
tractable aggregation of social welfare across individuals, we follow a common specication
in the literature to consider linear utility given by ujt = E[c
j
t ], where c
j
t denotes consumption
by individual j.18 Labor supply is used as an input for nal goods. Final goods can be
consumed by individuals, devoted to various types of R&D activities or used as an input for
intermediate goods. To model the e¤ects of IPR, we consider a specic IPR parametert that
captures the e¤ects of domestic patent protection on imitation,19 which in turn a¤ects FDI
and innovation. This setup captures the main concerns of policymakers in China. We assume
that domestic innovation is a¤ected by domestic patent protection but not by foreign patent
protection, and this assumption is consistent with the observation that the vast majority of
inventions by residents in China is only patented domestically.20
16In the working-paper version of this study, we also report the results based on a dynamic panel regression
and show that the nding of 1 < 0 and 2 > 0 is robust to this extension; see Chu et al. (2013).
17Our model borrows many elements from other Schumpeterian models of distance to frontier, such as
Acemoglu et al. (2003, 2006), Aghion et al. (2005) and Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005).
18Alternatively, we can assume that there is a representative household in each period. In this case, the
household faces a static budget constraint in which consumption expenditure equals income that consists of
wage income and monopolistic prots earned by domestic rms. Given that labor supply is inelastic, these
two formulations are equivalent.
19Although we dont explicitly model patent length in this study, one can also think of t a¤ecting the
hazard rate of a patent being imitated, which in turn determines the e¤ective lifetime of a patent. In the
case of China, the statutory term of patent has been 20 years and remained unchanged since 1992 despite
two patent reforms in 2000 and 2008. Furthermore, the Ginarte-Park index of patent rights, which is a
commonly used empirical measure of patent strength, considers statutory patent duration as only one of ve
measures of patent rights; see Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008) for details.
20For example, according to data in WIPO (2012), residents in China made less than 20,000 patent
applications abroad in 2011, which represent a mere 4.6% of the 435,608 patent applications made by residents
in China in 2011. Gri¢ th and Miller (2011) provide empirical evidence that the growth in patenting activities
in China is associated with a growth in the creation of technologies by Chinese inventors.
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A key di¤erence between our model and the models in Acemoglu et al. (2003, 2006) is
in our formulation of the interaction between imitation of foreign technologies and domestic
innovation in the developing country. In previous studies, imitation and innovation in an in-
dustry are assumed to be performed by the same rm implying that the interaction between
imitation and innovation lies in the resource allocation across the two types of activities
within a rm. In contrast, in our model, imitation and innovation in an industry are per-
formed by two di¤erent rms capturing the realistic scenario in which domestic innovation
in the developing country can be displaced by the importation of more advanced foreign
technologies. In other words, our framework captures in a stylized way both the positive
spillover e¤ect and the negative market-stealing e¤ect of foreign technologies on domestic
technologies discussed in the empirical literature on technology di¤usion.21
Another key di¤erence is that we take into consideration two channels of foreign tech-
nology transfer (a) FDI and (b) imitation. Within this framework, a stronger patent system
makes imitation of foreign technologies more di¢ cult. Consequently, the lower intensity of
imitation improves the incentives for technology transfer via FDI, and this theoretical nd-
ing is consistent with empirical evidence.22 As for the e¤ects of stronger patent protection
on domestic innovation, there are a direct positive e¤ect from the decrease in imitation and
an indirect negative e¤ect from the increase in FDI (i.e., the displacement e¤ect of foreign
technologies on domestic innovation). Therefore, our model features an inverted-U e¤ect
of patent strength on domestic innovation that has been documented in recent empirical
studies, such as Lerner (2009) and Qian (2007).23
In the model, we consider a specic sequence of actions by domestic innovators, foreign
rms and domestic imitators. In particular, we assume that the action of domestic innovators
is followed by foreign rms and then imitators.24 This specic sequence of actions gives rise
to the two important and realistic implications discussed above. First, domestic innovation
may be displaced by foreign technologies. Second, a strengthening of patent protection that
reduces imitation may encourage both domestic innovation and foreign technology transfer
21See for example Aitken and Harrison (1999), who nd that "productivity in domestically owned plants
declines when foreign investment increases. This suggests a negative spillover from foreign to domestic
enterprises, which we interpret as a market-stealing e¤ect."
22An early study by Lee and Manseld (1996) nds a positive e¤ect of IPR on FDI. Although subsequent
studies produce mixed results, recent empirical studies tend to nd a positive e¤ect. For example, Javorcik
(2004) nds that IPR has a positive e¤ect on FDI in technology-intensive sectors of transition economies.
Considering a more comprehensive set of countries, Branstetter et al. (2006) also nd that strengthening
IPR has a positive e¤ect on technology transfer.
23See also Akiyama and Furukawa (2009), Furukawa (2007, 2010), Horii and Iwaisako (2007), Iwaisako
and Futagami (2013) and Chu et al. (2012), who derive an inverted-U relationship between patent strength
and innovation in the R&D-based growth model via other mechanisms.
24It is useful to note that this formulation allows for the possibility that domestic innovators may decide
not to invest in innovation at an early stage of development when patent protection is too weak.
9
supporting the abovementioned rationales for implementing a modern IPR system in China.
Finally, as in previous studies, we assume that there is no trade in factors of production
and the developing country takes the world technology frontier as given.25 A slight modi-
cation from previous studies is that we allow for trade in nal goods, so that foreign rms
that perform FDI can retrieve their monopolistic prots out of the developing country.
3.1 Final goods
This sector is perfectly competitive, and rms take the output and input prices as given.
Final goods Yt (chosen as the numeraire) are produced by combining labor input with a unit
continuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods Xt(i) indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. We consider a
standard production function.
Yt = L
1 
t
Z 1
0
A1 t (i)X

t (i)di, (1)
where At(i) is the level of technology associated with Xt(i). The aggregate supply of labor
Lt is one for all t.26 The conditional demand function for Xt(i) is
Xt(i) = At(i) [=Pt(i)]
1=(1 ) , (2)
where Pt(i) is the price of Xt(i) for i 2 [0; 1].27
3.2 Intermediate goods and domestic innovation
There is a unit continuum of intermediate goods indexed by i 2 [0; 1], and each industry i is
dominated by a temporary monopolistic leader. In each industry, an individual is randomly
chosen as the entrepreneur, who is given the opportunity to innovate at the beginning of the
period and potentially dominate the industry for the remaining period. In the next period,
all relevant patents expire28 and the monopolistic position will be randomly assigned to
another entrepreneur who performs the next innovation. This simple setup, which is in line
25See Section 6 for a discussion of this assumption.
26Setting Lt = 1 also allows us to sidestep the issue of scale e¤ects.
27There is also a conditional demand function for labor given by wt = (1   )
hR 1
0
A1 t (i)X

t (i)di
i
=Lt ,
where wt is the wage rate and Lt = 1. Given that labor supply is inelastic and the nal goods sector is the
only sector that employs labor, we do not need to determine wt to solve the model.
28The current patent length of 20 years in China and most countries is indeed shorter than the average
generation length of 25 years.
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with other Schumpeterian models of distance to frontier, simplies the model by equating
the return to R&D to the monopolistic prot in the current period, and this simplication
allows us to focus on the dynamic aspects of distance to frontier.
For each monopolist, producing one unit of intermediate goods requires one unit of nal
goods. The familiar prot-maximizing price is Pt(i) = 1=.29 Therefore, using (2), we can
derive the amount of prot as
t(i) = Pt(i)Xt(i) Xt(i) = At(i), (3)
where   (1  )(1+)=(1 ) is a composite parameter.
At the beginning of time t, the level of productivity in industry i is At 1(i). An entrepre-
neur is given the opportunity to increase the level of productivity to eAt(i) = (1 + t)At 1(i),
where t is the step size of innovation that is a choice variable.
30 The expected return to
innovation in industry i is (1   pt)[ eAt(i)   At 1(i)] = (1   pt)tAt 1(i), where pt 2 [0; 1]
is the endogenous probability (to be derived below) that the monopolistic position will be
taken away either by a foreign rm or by a domestic imitator before production in this
period begins. When this probability pt is high, the entrepreneur only has a small chance
of capturing the monopolistic prot and has less incentives to do R&D. This setup relates
to the idea of intellectual appropriability discussed in Cozzi (2001) and Cozzi and Spinesi
(2006). Under this interpretation, pt can be viewed as the probability that the monopolistic
position is stolen by another entrepreneur before the innovator manages to start production.
To increase the level of technology by a step size of t in industry i, the entrepreneur
has to devote Rt(i) units of nal goods to R&D. We consider a simple convex cost function
given by
Rt(i) =
(t)


At 1(i), (4)
where  is a productivity parameter and  > 2.31 In (4), the scaling by At 1(i) is common in
the literature to capture increasing di¢ culty in innovation and to ensure a stationary t on
the balanced-growth path. The expected prot of R&D is (1 pt)tAt 1(i) Rt(i). Simple
29In line with the standard treatment in this class of models, we assume that the monopolist of an industry
is always able to charge the unconstrained monopoly price.
30It is useful to note that although a domestically invented technology may not be as advanced as foreign
technologies, it was nevertheless patentable in China before its third amendment to patent laws when the
novelty requirement for a patentable invention required only local novelty within China. After the recent
passage of this third amendment, patentability in China is now based on global novelty. Nevertheless,
domestic innovators may invent locally adapted inventions that are "su¢ ciently" di¤erent from foreign
inventions and patentable in China.
31This parameter assumption  > 2 ensures that the equilibrium growth rate is concave in pt, so that the
growth-maximizing level of patent protection is an interior solution.
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di¤erentiation yields the equilibrium step size of innovation given by
t = [(1  pt)]1=( 1) (5)
for i 2 [0; 1]. Equation (5) shows that an increase in pt reduces the incentives for innovation
and decreases t.
Proposition 1 Weaker intellectual appropriability (i.e., a larger pt) decreases the equilib-
rium step size of domestic innovation.
3.3 Foreign direct investment
After the domestic entrepreneurs complete their R&D projects and before they sell their
products, foreign rms may transfer recent technological developments from the world tech-
nology frontier to the developing country. We refer to this process as FDI. The decision
of FDI is made by foreign rms, and their incentives depend on monopolistic prots in the
developing country. After the foreign rms set up production in the domestic economy, they
combine their advanced foreign technologies with domestic intermediate goods to produce
nal goods.32
FDI is a random process. If the investment is successful in industry i, then the foreign
rm takes away the monopolistic position from the domestic entrepreneur in that industry.
Before this process of technology transfer begins, the level of productivity in industry i at
time t is eAt(i) = (1 + t)At 1(i). If the technology transfer succeeds, then productivity in
industry i further increases to33
bAt(i) = eAt(i) + gAt 1. (6)
At 1 is the level of technology at the world technology frontier at time t   1 and evolves
according to
At = (1 + g
)At 1, (7)
32This phenomenon di¤ers from capital embodied technology transfer, under which domestic rms obtain
foreign technologies by buying foreign equipments and machineries that contain foreign technologies. In the
case of China, obtaining foreign technologies by enticing foreign rms to set up production facilities in China
seems to be an equally common approach.
33Here we assume that the transfer of foreign technologies is incomplete in the sense that domestic tech-
nology level does not jump to the world technology frontier for two reasons. First, complete technology
transfer would rule out any interesting convergence process. Second, in reality we rarely observe that rms
in developing countries immediately catch up with rms in developed economies. The automobile industry
in China would be a classic example in which despite many years of FDI, "China is still ve to ten years
from building cars to global standards without foreign help." The Economist (2013)
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where g is the exogenous growth rate of the world technology frontier. In other words, (6)
considers the case in which the domestic economy imports newly developed frontier tech-
nologies from abroad. Although newly developed technologies represent an important source
of technology transfer to developing countries, it is conceivable that previously developed
technologies that have not been adopted by developing countries also represent another im-
portant source of technology transfer. Therefore, we explore this extension in Section 5.1.34
The expected value of a successful transfer of foreign technologies via FDI in industry i
is (1   ts) bAt(i), where t 2 [0; 1] is the probability that the transferred technologies will
be imitated by a domestic rm in which case the foreign rm has to give away a share
s 2 [0; 1] of the market to the domestic imitator (to be discussed further below). To achieve
a successful FDI project with probability ft in industry i, the foreign rm has to devote Ft(i)
units of nal goods. For analytical simplicity, we consider a quadratic cost function given by
Ft(i) =
(ft)
2
2f
bAt(i), (8)
where f is a productivity parameter. The expected prot of FDI is ft(1  ts) bAt(i) Ft(i).
Simple di¤erentiation yields the equilibrium intensity of FDI given by
ft = (1  ts)f 2 [0; 1] (9)
for i 2 [0; 1].35 Equation (9) shows that either a larger probability of imitation t or a larger
share s of the market to be given away to the imitator reduces the incentives for technology
transfer via FDI.
Proposition 2 A higher rate of imitation (i.e., a larger t) reduces the intensity of FDI.
3.4 Imitation and intellectual property rights
After the foreign rms complete their process of technology transfer, the domestic economy
consists of two types of industries that are occupied by either (a) domestic innovators or (b)
foreign rms. In the case of (a), a domestic individual is randomly chosen as an imitator, who
has the ability to adapt the more advanced foreign technologies from other industries. We
refer to this type of imitation as e¢ cient imitation et.36 In the case of (b), another domestic
34In Section 5.1, we consider a more general specication bAt(i) = eAt(i) + gAt 1 + (At 1  At 1).
35A parameter condition (P1) to be stated below will ensure that ft < 1.
36We call this e¢ cient imitation because it raises the level of technology in the industry.
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individual is randomly chosen as an imitator, who has the ability to imitate existing foreign
technologies in the industry. We refer to this type of imitation as ine¢ cient imitation t.37
Both types of imitation are random. If the imitation process is successful, then the imitator
takes away (a) the monopolistic position from the domestic innovator in the case of e¢ cient
imitation et or (b) some market share s 2 [0; 1] from the foreign rm in the case of ine¢ cient
imitation t.38 For s = 0, the imitator is unable to take away any market share from the
foreign rm. For s = 1, the imitator takes away the entire market share from the foreign
rm. The general case of s 2 (0; 1) captures the scenario, in which the foreign rm and the
domestic imitator collude and share the monopolistic prot as in Segerstrom (1991).39 Under
this general case, the domestic imitator is able to take away some market share from the
foreign rm because domestic rms often have a competitive advantage over foreign rms
through local knowledge and local network in developing countries. For example, Branstetter
et al. (2006) note that when a foreign rm "...transfers this knowledge to local employees,
there is a risk that these employees will defect to a local manufacturer, taking sensitive
technology with them. These employees are able to combine the patented and unpatented
elements of the rmstechnology, e¤ectively competing with it in the local market."
The return to e¢ cient imitation is  bAt(i). To achieve an e¢ cient imitation with proba-
bility et in industry i, the imitator has to devote Et(i) units of nal goods to imitative R&D.
Again, we consider a simple quadratic cost function given by
Et(i) = t
(et)
2
2e
bAt(i), (10)
where e is a productivity parameter for e¢ cient imitation and t 2 (0;1) is a policy variable
determining the level of patent protection at time t. This formulation captures the idea that
a stronger system of patent protection (i.e., a larger t) makes imitation more di¢ cult and
potentially improves intellectual appropriability by domestic innovators. The expected prot
from e¢ cient imitation is et bAt(i) Et(i). Simple di¤erentiation yields the probability of a
successful e¢ cient imitation in industry i given by
et = minfe=t; 1g (11)
37We call this ine¢ cient imitation because it contributes nothing to the industrys level of technology.
38Similarly, we can also introduce another prot-sharing parameter between domestic innovators and
domestic imitators without changing our main results. However, we think it is more natural for the domestic
imitators, who have imitated the more advanced foreign technologies from other industries, to force out the
domestic innovators who possess less advanced technologies.
39Here we assume that the foreign rm and the domestic imitator do not engage in competitive pricing
that would wipe out the industrys prot, which in turn could deter the domestic imitator from entering the
market, because in reality we do observe domestic rms competing with foreign rms and imitating their
technologies.
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for i 2 [0; 1].
The return to ine¢ cient imitation is s bAt(i). To achieve an ine¢ cient imitation with
probability t in industry i, the imitator has to devote It(i) units of nal goods to imitative
R&D. Again, we consider a simple quadratic cost function given by40
It(i) = t
(t)
2
2
bAt(i), (12)
where  is a productivity parameter for ine¢ cient imitation. This formulation captures the
idea that a stronger system of patent protection makes the imitation of foreign technologies
more di¢ cult and improves intellectual appropriability by foreign rms. The expected prot
is ts bAt(i)   It(i). Simple di¤erentiation yields the probability of a successful ine¢ cient
imitation in industry i given by
t = minfs=t; 1g (13)
for i 2 [0; 1].
Proposition 3 A stronger system of patent protection (i.e., a larger t) reduces both types
of imitation.
Proposition 3 shows that stronger patent protection reduces both e¢ cient and ine¢ cient
imitations. The reduction in ine¢ cient imitation increases foreign technology transfer via
FDI from Proposition 2. As for the e¤ects on domestic innovation, stronger patent protection
has a direct positive e¤ect by reducing e¢ cient imitation and an indirect negative e¤ect by
increasing FDI. In (5), the probability pt is given by pt = ft + (1   ft)et. In other words,
at the time of innovation, a domestic innovator may be subsequently displaced by a foreign
rm with probability ft or by a domestic imitator with probability (1 ft)et. Di¤erentiating
pt = ft + (1  ft)et with respect to t yields
@pt
@t
= (1  et) @ft
@t
>0
+ (1  ft) @et
@t
<0
. (14)
Equation (14) shows that a larger t increases pt through ft (i.e., the displacement e¤ect of
foreign technologies) and decreases pt through et (i.e., the direct e¤ect of reducing domestic
40It is useful to note that the IPR policy parameter t a¤ects both types of imitation symmetrically.
In other words, patent policy protects both domestic and foreign rms in accordance with the national
treatment of the TRIPS Agreement that requires member countries to provide the same patent rights to
domestic and foreign rms.
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imitation). Applying (9), (11) and (13), we nd that
@pt
@t
< 0() t > 1
2s

s2
e
  1  f
f

. (15)
Recall that domestic innovation t is decreasing in pt from Proposition 1. Therefore, if
and only if (15) holds, then patent strength t would have a monotonically positive e¤ect
on domestic innovation t. In other words, for a su¢ ciently small t (or equivalently, a
su¢ ciently large t), it is possible for @t=@t to become negative (i.e., @pt=@t > 0)
implying an inverted-U e¤ect of t on domestic innovation t. The negative e¤ect of patent
protection on domestic innovation arises from the displacement e¤ect of foreign technology
transfer via FDI.
For a developing country, it is unlikely that the level of patent protection has reached this
level.41 Therefore, we impose the following su¢ cient condition to ensure that @t=@t > 0
for t 2 (0;1). This parameter condition is given by
f <
1
(1 + s2=e)
, (P1)
for all s 2 [0; 1], which in turn implies f < 1=.42 For the rest of the analysis, we assume that
(P1) holds, so that the e¤ect of patent protection on domestic innovation is monotonically
positive. However, due to its negative e¤ect on technology transfer through imitation, we
will show that the overall e¤ect of patent protection on economic growth continues to follow
an inverted-U shape.
Proposition 4 A stronger system of patent protection (i.e., a larger t) raises FDI intensity
ft. If (P1) holds, then a stronger system of patent protection also has a positive e¤ect on
domestic innovation in the developing country.
For a given level of technology in an industry, (8) shows that a larger ft also raises the
amount of FDI. This nding is consistent with the time series behaviors of FDI and patent
strength in China discussed in the introduction.
41See Park (2008b) for a survey of empirical studies on patent strength and innovation. Upon surveying
the empirical literature, Park (2008b) concludes that although an inverted-U e¤ect of patent strength on
innovation is plausible, empirical evidence seems to suggest that the level of patent protection in most
countries is still on the upward-sloping side of the curve.
42This condition is su¢ cient for ft < 1 in (9).
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3.5 Aggregation
At the beginning of time t, the level of technology is industry i is At 1(i). Then, the domestic
innovator increases the level of technology to eAt(i). After that, if either a foreign rm or
a domestic imitator succeeds in transferring foreign technologies into industry i, then the
level of technology would further increase to bAt(i). The transfer of foreign technologies
succeeds with probability ft whereas e¢ cient imitation of foreign technologies succeeds with
probability et. Using the law of large numbers, we derive the following law of motion for
aggregate technology At 
R
At(i)di in the developing country.
At = [ft + (1  ft)et]gAt 1 + (1 + t)At 1. (16)
Intuitively, (16) states that the industries experience an average productivity improvement
by tAt 1 through domestic innovation and a fraction pt = ft + (1   ft)et of the industries
experiences an additional productivity improvement by gAt 1 through either FDI or e¢ cient
imitation.43
We derive the aggregate production function by substituting Pt(i) = 1= and (2) to (1).
Yt = At, (17)
where   2=(1 ) is a composite parameter. The resource constraint on nal goods is
Yt = Ct +Xt +Rt + Et + It + Ft +NXt, (18)
where (a) Ct is aggregate consumption, (b) Xt is the amount of nal goods used in the
production of intermediate goods, (c) Rt is aggregate innovative R&D, (d) Et is total ex-
penditure on e¢ cient imitation, (e) It is total expenditure on ine¢ cient imitation, (f) Ft is
total expenditure on FDI, and (g) NXt is net export. Using Pt(i) = 1= and (2), we obtain
Xt = 
2=(1 )At. (19)
From (4), aggregate innovative R&D is
Rt =
(t)


At 1. (20)
43Rewriting (16) yields (At   At 1)=At 1 = ptgAt 1=At 1 + t, which is similar to the seminal Nelson-
Phelpscatch-up function, and to which we have here provided some microfoundation, via our variables pt
and t. See Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) for an analysis of other catch-up functions.
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From (10), aggregate expenditure on e¢ cient imitation is
Et = (1  ft)t (et)
2
2e
[(1 + t)At 1 + g
At 1]. (21)
From (12), aggregate expenditure on ine¢ cient imitation is
It = ftt
(t)
2
2
[(1 + t)At 1 + g
At 1]. (22)
From (8), aggregate expenditure on FDI is
Ft =
(ft)
2
2f
[(1 + t)At 1 + g
At 1]. (23)
As for the net export of nal goods, it is given by
NXt =

ft(1  ts)   (ft)
2
2f

[(1 + t)At 1 + g
At 1]. (24)
In other words, the domestic economy exports goods to pay for the monopolistic prots (net
of FDI expenditure) earned by foreign rms. Finally, aggregate consumption is
Ct = (1  2)At   (Rt + Et + It + Ft +NXt). (25)
3.6 Convergence
If we dene at  At=At as an inverse measure of the developing countrys distance to the
world technology frontier, then the law of motion for at is
at = [ft + (1  ft)et]

g
1 + g

+

1 + t
1 + g

at 1  H(at 1). (26)
Equation (26) is plotted in Figure 2 for a constant value of .
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Figure 2: Convergence
Figure 2 shows that at converges to a unique steady-state value given by
a =
f + (1  f)e
1  =g . (27)
To ensure that a 2 (0; 1), we naturally assume44
g >

1  p =
()1=( 1)
(1  p)( 2)=( 1) , (P2)
where p = f + (1  f)e. At the steady state, the developing country grows at the same rate
as the world technology frontier despite the fact that the step size of domestic innovation  is
smaller than g. However, if the developing country fails to obtain foreign technologies (i.e.,
f = e = 0), then it would diverge from the rest of the world because domestic innovation
alone is insu¢ cient for the country to catch up with the world technology frontier. Further-
more, (27) shows that stronger patent protection has opposing e¤ects on the steady-state
level of distance to frontier. On the one hand, a larger  stimulates domestic innovation
 and FDI f implying a positive e¤ect on a. On the other hand, it discourages e¢ cient
imitation e implying a negative e¤ect on a.
4 Stage-dependent IPR protection
In this section, we rst analytically characterize the growth-maximizing level of patent pro-
tection. Then, we provide a numerical simulation on the welfare-maximizing path of patent
44(P2) also implies g > , which guarantees convergence.
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protection.
4.1 Growth-maximizing IPR protection
Given that achieving a specic growth rate (around 7% to 7.5%) has been a key objective in
Chinas ve-year plans until recently,45 we are interested in analyzing the level of patent pro-
tection that maximizes contemporaneous economic growth. The growth rate of technology
in the developing country at time t is
gt  At
At 1
  1 = pt g

at 1
+ t, (28)
where pt = ft+(1 ft)et. This equation shows that for a backward country (i.e., a small at 1),
obtaining foreign technologies through pt (i.e., FDI and imitation) is relatively important
for achieving a higher growth rate. In contrast, for an advanced country (i.e., a large at 1),
domestic innovation t becomes relatively important. This important property gives rise to
a stage-dependent growth-maximizing level of patent protection.
Di¤erentiating (28) with respect to pt yields
@gt
@pt
=
g
at 1
  ()
1=( 1)
(   1)(1  pt)( 2)=( 1) , (29)
@2gt
@p2t
=   ()
1=( 1)(   2)
(   1)2(1  pt)1+( 2)=( 1) < 0. (30)
The second-order condition implies that the growth rate gt in the developing country is
globally concave in pt, whereas the rst-order condition implies that the growth-maximizing
pgt is given by
pgt = 1 

()1=( 1)
(   1)
at 1
g
( 1)=( 2)
2 (0; 1), (31)
which is decreasing in at 1 and increasing in g. To see that p
g
t > 0 for any at 1 < 1,
g >
()1=( 1)
(1  p)( 2)=( 1) >
()1=( 1)
(   1) >
()1=( 1)
(   1) at 1, (32)
where the rst inequality follows from (P2), and the second inequality follows from 1  p <
(   1)( 1)=( 2), where  > 2.
45In the most recent ve-year plan (2011 to 2015), the Chinese government has shifted its focus to em-
phasize more on householdswelfare. For example, Feldstein (2011) writes that Chinas new ve-year plan
"is to shift o¢ cial policy from maximizing GDP growth toward raising consumption and average workers
standard of living".
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Because pt = ft + (1   ft)et 2 [f; 1], the following parameter condition ensures that
there exists a value of t 2 (0;1) that equates pt = pgt .
f <
pgt

. (P3)
Therefore, the growth-maximizing pgt can be mapped into a unique level of growth-maximizing
patent strength gt that is increasing in at 1 because pt is monotonically decreasing in t
given (P1). In other words, although patent protection has a monotonically positive e¤ect
on domestic innovation, it still has an inverted-U e¤ect on economic growth because growth
is driven by innovation, FDI and imitation. Furthermore, the growth-maximizing level of
patent protection increases as the developing country evolves toward the world technology
frontier. This nding of a stage-dependent growth-maximizing patent protection is driven
by the property that the relative importance between foreign technologies and domestic in-
novation on the developing countrys growth rate changes endogenously as it evolves towards
the world technology frontier. Also, it is interesting to note that in the case of an increase
in g, pgt increases and 
g
t decreases for a given at 1. Intuitively, when the technology fron-
tier grows at a faster rate, it is more e¢ cient for the developing country to imitate foreign
technologies than to invest in domestic innovation by implementing a weaker patent system.
Proposition 5 As a developing country evolves towards the world technology frontier, the
growth-maximizing patent strength increases over time. In addition, for a given stage of
economic development, the growth-maximizing patent strength is decreasing in the growth
rate of frontier technology.
4.2 Welfare-maximizing IPR protection
As for the welfare-maximizing patent strength, we consider a government that chooses t as
a function of at 1 to maximize aggregate welfare of current and future individuals given byP1
t=1 
t 1Ut, where Ut 
R
ujtdj.
46 The assumption of risk neutrality implies that aggregate
welfare of individuals at time t is simply given by aggregate consumption at time t (i.e.,
Ut = Ct). Substituting (20) - (24) into (25) yields
Ct = [(1  2)pt   t]gAt 1 +

(1  2)  (t)

(1 + t)
  t

(1 + t)At 1, (33)
46We assume policy commitment by the government to rule out time inconsistent policies. For example,
at the beginning of each period, the government may have the incentives to announce strong patent rights
in order to attract FDI and then renege on this policy by allowing domestic rms to easily imitate foreign
rmstechnologies and to keep the prots in the domestic economy.
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where t  (1  ft)t(et)2=(2e) + ftt(t)2=(2) + ft(1  ts). The governments objective
is
max
t
1X
t=1
t 1Ct = A0 max
t
1X
t=1
[(1 + g)]t 1 ct, (34)
where ct  Ct=At 1. Using (33), we can rearrange terms to obtain
ct = [(1  2)pt   t]g +

(1  2)  (t)

(1 + t)
  t

(1 + t)at 1. (35)
Given (34) and (35), we can solve for the socially optimal policy as a time-invariant dynamic
programming, using the following Bellman equation.
v(at 1) = max
t
ct + (1 + g
)v(at), (36)
where the law of motion for at is given by (26). Substituting (26) and (35) into (36), we
derive an expression only in at 1, parameters, and policy variable t. Given the analytical
complexity of this problem, we consider a numerical approach (described in an unpublished
appendix) to simulate the welfare-maximizing path of patent strength ut .
Our stylized model contains the following parameters fg; ; ; s; ; e; ; f ; g and vari-
ables fat 1;tg. Some of these parameters such as fs; ; e; ; f ; g are nonstandard, so we
calibrate as many of them as possible using data on the Chinese economy. For the para-
meters that we cannot calibrate, we have to explore a range of values for robustness check.
Therefore, this numerical exercise should be viewed as illustrative.
We consider 20 years in a generation. For the (inverse) distance-to-frontier variable, we
set at 1 = 0:11 to capture the relative labor productivity between China and the US in
2005. For the growth rate of frontier technologies, we set g = (1 + 1:5%)20   1 to capture
the long-run average annual TFP growth rate in the US. For the discount factor, we set 
to match an annual discount rate of 10% to ensure that utility is bounded despite the high
growth rate in China. For the labor share 1 , we set  to 0.6 to match the 40% labor share
of GDP in China.47 For the prot-sharing parameter between foreign rms and domestic
imitative rms, we set s = 0:5 as a benchmark and also consider s 2 f0; 1g for robustness
check. For the innovation parameter, we set  = 1 as a benchmark and also consider other
values  2 f0:5; 2g for robustness check. For the imitation parameters, we set e = 1 and
consider the symmetric case of  = e as a benchmark, but we also consider  2 f0:5e; 2eg for
robustness check. For the FDI parameter, we set f = 9. Finally, for the curvature parameter
47See for example Luo and Zhang (2010) for data on labor share in China.
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in the innovation cost function, we set  = 5. Given these parameter values, the optimal
value of ut evaluated at at 1 = 0:11 is 0.053. With this complete set of parameter values,
we can then compute the following moments from the model and compare them to the data
of the Chinese economy. We nd that from the model, the annual growth rate of output is
7.5%, consumption as a share of GDP is 0.49, and FDI as a share of GDP is 0.032. These
calibrated moments are in line with the data on China from the Penn World Table and the
World Development Indicators.
Using the above parameter values, we simulate the optimal path of IPR policyut and nd
that it is increasing in at 1.48 This nding is robust to other parameter values. Hence, these
numerical simulations indicate that our theoretical prediction on the growth-maximizing
policy also applies to the welfare-maximizing policy. In Figure 3, we show our benchmark
simulation outcome.
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Figure 3: Optimal IPR policy as a function of the
(inverse) distance to frontier
48This result implies that it is optimal for the government to constantly reform the patent system as the
country develops. However, implementing a reform is costly and occupies political leaderstime, which we
do not model in this study. As a result, it is reasonable to expect occasional (rather than continuous) policy
changes in the real world. More realistically, the political and legal environment evolves gradually in the
direction of an increase in the enforcement of IPR. For example, a recent report prepared by the US-China
Business Council (2013) nds that "China has made progress in recent years with continued improvements
to its legal and regulatory framework for IPR protection, and gradual improvements to enforcement." All
this is implicit in our IPR parameter t, which is meant to incorporate explicit legal aspects as well as the
e¤ective enforcement of patent rights.
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5 Extensions
In this section, we explore a number of extensions to our baseline model. In Section 4.1, we
consider a more general specication for the transfer of foreign technologies. In Section 4.2,
we analyze the prot-sharing parameter s as a policy variable. In Section 4.3, we allow for
the possibility that domestic innovators can engage in preemption to stie against imitation.
5.1 Transfer of foreign technologies
In this subsection, we consider the case in which frontier technologies and also previously
developed technologies that have not been adopted by the domestic economy are both im-
portant sources of technology transfer. In this case, we assume a more general specication
by modifying (6) to bAt(i) = eAt(i) + gAt 1 + (At 1   At 1), (37)
where At 1   At 1 is the distance between frontier and domestic levels of technology,49 and
 > 0 is a parameter determining the importance of this channel of technology transfer
(nesting our baseline model as a special case with ! 0). In other words, if FDI succeeds in
industry i, then the level of productivity in the industry increases by gAt 1 +(A

t 1 At 1)
(instead of just gAt 1 as in Section 3.3).
Under the more general specication in (37), equation (16) becomes
At = pt[g
At 1 + (A

t 1   At 1)] + (1 + t)At 1, (38)
where pt = [ft + (1  ft)et]. In other words, in addition to the average productivity improve-
ment by tAt 1 in all industries, a fraction pt of the industries experiences an additional
productivity gain by gAt 1 + (A

t 1   At 1) through either FDI or e¢ cient imitation of
foreign technologies. Rearranging terms, we derive from (38) the growth rate of the domestic
economy given by
gt  At
At 1
  1 = pt(g
 + )
at 1
+ t   pt. (39)
Di¤erentiating gt with respect to pt yields
@gt
@pt
=
g + 
at 1
  ()
1=( 1)
(   1)(1  pt)( 2)=( 1)   . (40)
Therefore, @2gt=@(pt)2 < 0 continues to be given by (30) as before. Setting @gt=@pt = 0 in
49To facilitate tractable aggregation of At 
R
At(i)di, we assume that the technological distance is
approximated by At 1  At 1 instead of At 1  At 1(i).
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(40) yields the growth-maximizing pgt given by
pgt = 1 

()1=( 1)
(   1)
at 1
g + (1  at 1)
( 1)=( 2)
, (41)
which is decreasing in at 1 and increasing in g. Given that pt = [ft+(1 ft)et] is the same as
in Section 3 and is strictly decreasing in t, there exists a unique level of growth-maximizing
patent strength gt that is increasing in at 1 and decreasing in g
 as before.
5.2 The prot-sharing parameter
In this subsection, we treat the prot-sharing parameter as a policy variable st and keep 
as a constant. For simplicity, we consider our baseline model with  = 0. Substituting (13)
into (9) yields
ft = (1  s2t =)f , (42)
which is decreasing in st. In other words, if the government implements a policy that increases
the share of prots obtained by domestic imitators (e.g., by favoring domestic rms in court),
then foreign rms would have less incentives to conduct FDI. Given that et in (11) does not
depend on st, di¤erentiating pt = ft + (1  ft)et with respect to st yields
@pt
@st
= (1  et)@ft
@st
< 0. (43)
Because pt is decreasing in st, domestic innovation t must be increasing in st. Intuitively,
increasing the share of prots that imitators can extract from foreign rms reduces FDI and
its negative e¤ect on domestic innovation. In other words, both st and t have a positive
e¤ect on domestic innovation t and a negative e¤ect on foreign technology transfer pt. Given
that the model is the same as before, the analysis in Section 4.1 applies, and there exists a
growth-maximizing pgt that is decreasing in at 1. Therefore, as a country develops (i.e., at 1
increases), the growth-maximizing level of pt decreases, and hence, the government chooses a
larger st to maximize economic growth. Therefore, whether we consider st or t as a policy
variable, the stage-dependent property applies.
5.3 Preemption against imitation
In this subsection, we consider an extension in which domestic innovators may strategically
choose a more drastic innovation to deter imitation. For simplicity, we consider a special case
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of our baseline model by setting f = 0; in other words, we remove the element of FDI and
assume that domestic imitators have the ability to copy foreign technologies from abroad.
In this setting, domestic innovators rst engage in domestic innovation, and then, domestic
imitators may enter the market with more advanced technologies imitated from abroad. The
imitation process is the same as e¢ cient imitation in Section 3.4.
To introduce preemption against imitation, we modify (10) to
Et(i) = 

tt
(et)
2
2e
bAt(i), (44)
where t captures in a stylized way the mechanism that a more drastic domestic innovation
makes the entry of imitators more di¢ cult, and  2 (0; 1) is a curvature parameter. Taking
t as given, an imitator chooses et to maximize the expected prot of imitation. Simple
di¤erentiation yields
et = min

e
tt
; 1

, (45)
which shows that a more drastic innovation reduces imitation.
As before, the expected return to R&D is (1 pt)tAt 1(i) Rt(i), where pt = et (recall
that ft = 0). Taking the imitators best response in (45) as given, the domestic innovator
in industry i maximizes the expected return to R&D by choosing t. Simple di¤erentiation
yields the following condition that characterizes the equilibrium step size of innovation t.
1  (1  )e
tt

 =
(t)
 1

, (46)
where the left-hand side is the marginal benet of raising t and the right-hand side is the
marginal cost of raising t. Given  2 (0; 1),50 it can be shown that there exists a unique
equilibrium level of t, which is increasing in t.
In other words, stronger patent protection reduces imitation and stimulates innovation
as in our baseline model. As before, the growth rate in the domestic economy is gt =
ptg
=at 1 + t, where pt = et is given by (45) and t is determined by (46). Di¤erentiating
gt with respect to t yields
@gt
@t
=
g
at 1
@et
@t
<0
+
@t
@t
>0
. (47)
50In the case of  = 1, the innovation step size t would be independent of patent strength t. In the
case of  > 1, t would be decreasing in t. However, we rule out these alternative cases given empirical
evidence for the positive e¤ect of patent rights on innovation in developing countries. For example, Chen
and Puttitanun (2005) provide empirical evidence that patent protection has a positive e¤ect on innovation
in developing countries.
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@t=@t > 0 captures the positive e¤ect of patent protection on domestic innovation that
contributes to economic growth. @et=@t < 0 captures the negative e¤ect of patent protec-
tion on the imitation of foreign technologies, and reducing the transfer of foreign technologies
hurts economic growth. Equation (47) shows that the relative importance of these two op-
posing e¤ects of t on gt is determined by at 1 (i.e., the inverse distance to frontier). When
a country is far away from (close to) the world technology frontier, the negative e¤ect of
patent protection on foreign technology transfer dominates (is dominated by) the positive
e¤ect of patent protection on domestic innovation. This implication is consistent with our
baseline model as well as the stylized facts documented in Section 2.
6 Conclusion
In this study, we have developed a simple Schumpeterian growth model of distance to frontier
to analyze the evolution of IPR protection in developing countries. Although our model
is stylized, we believe that it captures the essence of the key issue that is the interrelation
between economic development and optimal IPR protection. Specically, an appropriate IPR
system contributes to the economic development of a country, which in turn determines the
optimal level of IPR protection in the country at a given stage of development. In summary,
we nd that the optimal strength of IPR protection increases as a developing country evolves
towards the world technology frontier, and this theoretical nding of stage-dependent IPR
protection is consistent with the actual evolution of the IPR system in China.
In terms of policy implications, our nding suggests that it is optimal for a developing
country to gradually strengthen its IPR protection. In other words, requiring a developing
country, such as China, to immediately raise its level of patent protection on par with
developed countries would hurt its social welfare. In other words, the Chinese government
would probably have wanted to implement a less signicant reform to the patent system if
the TRIPS Agreement were not a requirement for the accession to the WTO.51 In a National
Academy of Sciences report, Merrill et al. (2004, p. 13) also argue that "patents exist in
most countries, and the degree to which countries at di¤erent stages of economic development
should adhere to the same standards of patentability, conform to the same rules, and follow
the same administrative procedures is an enormously complex although extremely important
set of issues. [...] readers should not infer that what we recommend for the United States we
believe less-developed countries should adopt." Our nding of stage-dependant IPR policy
51Although the TRIPS Agreement requires developing countries to raise their level of patent protection
on par with developed countries, the de facto increase in patent protection in China is likely to be smaller
than expected due to an imperfect enforcement of statutory patent rights.
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reiterates their concern and provides a justication for the WTOs procedure that when the
TRIPS Agreement was implemented in developed countries in 1996, developing countries
and least developed countries were given an extension of 4 years and 11 years respectively
to apply the agreements provisions.
Finally, in the theoretical model, we consider a developing country that takes the world
technology frontier as given. Although it is arguable that technological progress in developed
countries may be a¤ected by the level of IPR protection in developing countries, it is still an
open debate among existing studies (cited in the introduction) as to whether Southern IPR
protection has a positive or negative e¤ect on Northern innovation. Therefore, we leave this
important but controversial issue to future research.
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Not for Publication
Unpublished Appendix: Numerical solution of the optimal IPR policy
Recall that the governments objective is
max
t
1X
t=1
t 1Ct = A0 max
t
1X
t=1
[(1 + g)]t 1 ct,
where ct is given by (35). Given the analytical complexity of this problem, we consider a
numerical approach to solve for the welfare-maximizing path of patent strength. In our nu-
merical analysis, we simulate numerically the value function, v(at 1), and the policy function
G(at 1)  t, adopting a standard value-function iteration method, according to which52:
1. We select a grid of points53 for [0; 1], i.e. the state space of ai, where now i 2 1; :::; N
indexes the i-th point in the grid (not time);
2. We start from an initial guess54 of v0(a);
3. We obtain numerical solutions for
v1i = max
i
ci + (1 + g
)v0(ai)
for all i 2 1; :::; N ;
4. We obtain a (cubic) polynomial spline approximation of v1(a) such that v1(ai) = v1i;
5. We iterate this procedure, this time starting from the new function v1(ai), obtaining
v2i = max
i
ci + (1 + g
)v1(ai)
for all i 2 1; :::; N ;
6. Obtain a polynomial spline approximation of v2(a) such that v2(ai) = v2i: this is
necessary for the maximization to take place in the continuous space [0; 1], thereby admitting
solutions for i corresponding to values of a not necessarily in the chosen grid55;
7. We keep repeating the maximization and approximation, until the change in vni and
in the policy variables does not exceed a tolerance value56.
52All computations have been performed using Matlab. The .m les used are available upon request.
53This number is N = 40 in our simulations.
54Identically equal to zero.
55Otherwise v1(ai) would not be dened.
56of 10 4, and the number of iterations do not exceed a maximum number of loops, set equal to 80 in our
simulations.
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